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Abstract 
We present a mathematical model which is the most abstract allowing (i) a fully compositional 
semantics for timed CSP and (ii) a natural abstraction map into the standard failures/divergences 
model of untimed CSP. We discuss in detail the construction and properties of this model, and 
explore the variety of nondeterministic behaviour it encompasses. We argue that, at least in 
some sense, this model is definitive for timed CSP. @ 1999-Elsevier Science B.V. All rights 
reserved 
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1. Introduction 
Although widely used throughout the world in such critical applications as aviation 
and nuclear power, real-time programming is a poorly understood discipline. There 
are severe problems which arise in understanding the behaviour of real-time sequential 
code, for example, relating to scheduling policies. The complexity of these problems 
will only intensify as we increasingly implement distributed real-time systems with the 
consequent possibility of nondeterministic behaviour. It is imperative that we begin 
now to develop the formal models on which the eventual solutions must be based. 
The authors have been working in this area for several years now, and have devised a 
number of related models for Timed CSP, a straightforward extension of Hoare’s CSP 
notation. This paper presents the model which is central to their work. 
Theories of concurrency can be divided into ‘untimed’ ones, which ignore the pre- 
cise times at which events occur, concentrating only upon their relative order, and 
‘real-time’ ones which do record these times. Untimed theories tend to be simpler to 
apply and are used when one is not concerned about the precise timing details of 
a system (or are leaving these for later) and when the system does not rely for its 
correct internal functioning upon time-dependent features such as timeouts. One of the 
major contributions of the CSP/CCS conceptual model of concurrency, with no shared 
memory and handshaken communication, is that it does have a rich and usable untimed 
theory and, until a few years ago, the literature concentrated on this side. 
Nevertheless, there are occasions where timed analysis is necessary, and so a number 
of models and methodologies have arisen for dealing with real time. The authors’ 
philosophy in designing real-time models has always been that the timed theory should 
not be separate from the untimed one, but should be a natural extension of it where 
there are well-understood ways of using both theories in the same development. Thus, 
one should be able to prove properties about the untimed behaviour of a system, and be 
able to use this information rigorously when later refining it to meet timing constraints. 
Equally, if one is building a large and complex system where one needs to rely on 
timing only for the correctness of a few components, then we should have ways of 
localising the more complex timed analysis to those components. 
To this end we have developed a number of timed models at different levels of 
abstraction in such a way that they and the untimed models form a natural hierarchy, 
with abstraction maps between them. Aspects of this work have already been reported 
and applied in a number of references, for example, [ 19,221. The key to getting the 
connection with the untimed models has been our use of the concept of stability (a 
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form of observation dual to divergence) together with more obvious ones such as timed 
analogues of traces and refusals. 
The purpose of this paper is to set down in definitive form the construction, philos- 
ophy and properties of the model that plays the central role in our theory, the timed 
failures-stability model. Though relatively complex, it turns out to be the simplest 
model which both gives a fully compositional congruence for Timed CSP and which 
extends the standard untimed failures/divergences model of CSP. The model presented 
here is somewhat more refined than the earlier version which we presented in [21]. 
Having constructed the model we then seek to understand it, and also the nature 
of nondeterminism in real-time concurrency, by carrying out an in-depth study of the 
forms of nondeterministic behaviour it predicts. 
We will show how the model can be used to give semantics to CSP. It can be 
argued that it is wrong to settle on a single semantics for a real-time language such as 
Timed CSP, since to do so constrains the implementor too much. And it is true that if 
one were implementing the constructs of CSP there would be a wide range of possible 
timed behaviours possible, no single one of which we could say is ‘right’. CSP is, 
however, essentially a theoretical and specification language rather than one in which 
implementations are built directly. Therefore we will argue that it is sensible to have 
a single standard semantics for Timed CSP with as clean and elegant a semantics as 
possible. The timing details of implementations can then be built up from its constituent 
parts. 
Finally, we conclude with a brief survey of the growing body of work that is devel- 
oping around this and our other models. This includes extensions to our basic theory, 
connections with other strands of work such as temporal logic, the development of 
methods to make the application of this work easier, and a number of real applica- 
tions. 
2. Time and topology: The construction of the model 
2.1. The syntax of Timed CSP 
At this stage it is appropriate to define the language we will use, in order that we 
can discuss it properly. 
The version of untimed CSP we use is essentially that of [3,4,9]. Additionally, we 
will denote by I the diverging process which performs an infinite sequence of internal 
actions without communicating. Further, we will allow infinite nondeterministic choices 
fl,S and the hiding of infinite sets of events P\X. 
One might think that a wide range of additional operators would be required to 
reflect timed behaviour (e.g., timeouts and interrupts). But in fact, under the standard 
semantics which we shall see later, it is possible to produce all of the commonly needed 
ones as derived operators (i.e., combinations of standard ones) if we introduce a single 
extra primitive: WAIT t for each real number t z 0 is the process which for t units of 
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time engages in no event visible to the environment and which then becomes able to 
terminate successfully. Intuitively, SKIP should coincide with WAIT 0. Therefore, for 
now at least, we will only add this one construct to the untimed language. 
In constructing the language, we assume we are given an alphabet C from which all 
communications are drawn. In the syntax below, a ranges over Z; X, Y over subsets 
of C; f over the set of functions from C to C; and F over ‘appropriate’ compositions 
of our syntactic operators. P(a) denotes a function from the given X to the space of 
processes and S ranges over nonempty subsets of the set of processes. p ranges over 
process variables (needed to define recursions): 
P::=IISTOP(SKIPI WAZTtIa+PIa:X+P(a)( 
P*wP,wnSIP, l/~2I~lXllY~2I~lIlI~2I 
~;P21P\~If-1(p)/f(P)l P1FP.P 
Technical notes: In order that the above syntax is properly defined we need to place 
a bound on the size of sets over which we allow ourselves to take nondeterministic 
choices. This bound can be any cardinal. We will find later that we need additional 
restrictions on the range of the function P(a) and the members of each infinite set over 
which we apply n. These additional restrictions will be described and discussed later. 
2.2. Postulates 
Timed CSP inherits more than its syntax from the untimed version of the language. 
Our basic understanding of what a CSP process is stays the same. It is an entity 
which communicates in some alphabet of atomic events. These communications are 
still thought of as instantaneous: the moment when an event occurs is the time when 
the handshake which is ‘its essence’ takes place. The fact that each sequential process 
performing an event actually takes some time to perform it is reflected in a delay 
between the instantaneous occurrence and the time when the sequential process is 
able to do anything else. Timed CSP also retains the postulate that any event that 
is observable by the environment can only occur when the environment offers it: a 
handshake between the process and the environment. This means that the view the 
environment has of a process is essentially the same as that of a another process with 
which it might be combined in parallel. 
We now state and discuss a number of assumptions we make which are specific to 
the way we view time. Some we would regard as obvious and others as ones which 
could have been varied. Yet others turn out to be necessary for subtle reasons we seek 
to explain. 
(1) Continuous time domain. The time domain consists of the nonnegative real 
numbers R+, and there is no lower bound on the time difference between consecu- 
tive observable events. The other plausible general-purpose time domain would be the 
natural numbers N (i.e., nonnegative integers). We choose R+ rather than N because 
the latter implies a granularity which might be appropriate in modelling a synchronous 
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system, but we wish to model processes running asynchronously in parallel. Using N in 
the latter case would sometimes force us to regard two events as happening simultane- 
ously even when they do not, which might lead us into errors when reasoning about the 
system where this occurred. It will, nevertheless, be necessary to allow several events 
to happen at the same time since there is nothing to stop a pair of unsynchronised 
parallel processes communicating simultaneously. 
We do not specify the units being used to model time: they might be nanoseconds, 
seconds or years so far as the theory is concerned. However in describing examples 
it is useful to follow the convention that the time consumed by the completion of an 
event as described above is generally much less than 1. 
(2) A global clock. We assume that all events recorded by processes within the 
system relate to a conceptual global clock. This is time as recorded by some notional 
environment which interacts with the process and observes what happens and when. 
The environment’s clock is not available in any sense to the processes comprising a 
network. This single thread of observed time leads to greater simplicity and abstraction. 
When an application requires a clock which processes can refer to, then we must 
model the clock directly in Timed CSP, probably as a process that runs in parallel with 
the ones which use it. We might well build some nondeterminism into the definition 
of such a clock to allow for the fact that it does not keep perfect time, and if there 
were more than one such clock then this nondeterminism would allow for them drifting 
apart. 
(3) Realism. We postulate that no process can perform infinitely many actions in a 
finite time. It is necessary to build this postulate into any semantics we build for CSP. 
Given the language described above, one would expect it to be maintained under the 
condition that any unwinding of a recursion is assumed to take time bounded below by 
some positive constant 6. It also turns out to be necessary, because of the expressive 
power of our model, to impose constraints on the domains of infinitary operators such 
as n and a :X -+ P(a). This will be discussed more later. 
(4) Hiding and termination. We wish (a --f P) to denote the process that is willing 
at any time to engage in the event a and then to behave like the process P. Clearly, 
if P=a+ P, we then wish P\a= 1. However, consider P=a--,STOP (the process 
that is willing to engage in a at any time 30 and then to deadlock). What do we wish 
P\a to denote? 
We have already discussed the principle that, in CSP, observability is equated with 
external control. Given the process a + P and an environment eager to perform an 
a immediately, we would expect that a would indeed occur at time 0. By hiding, 
we remove control over the event(s) hidden. Hence, any time a process is willing to 
engage in a hidden action, it is permitted to do so and we would expect the hidden 
event to occur if no other event did. Thus, we assume that each hidden event takes 
place as soon as such an event becomes possible. 
Our intuitive model of hiding is that of placing a given process within a box in 
which all the events to be hidden are constantly on offer, and then concealing all the 
hidden events within the box from the environment. 
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In the above example, we would wish 
(a --f STOP)\a = WAITS; STOP 
where 5 is the time (assumed here to be deterministic) for the completion of the 
event a. 
In order to model this idea of an event occurring as soon as it becomes available, 
we will need to record (either explicitly or implicitly) not only those times at which 
events are available, but also those at which they can become available. 
Exactly the same argument applies to occurrence of the termination event J in the 
sequential composition P; Q. The effect of this composition is to make such an event 
invisible and automatic, exactly as in hiding. Therefore we make the same assumption, 
namely that the hidden J will occur and enable Q as soon as it becomes available 
in P. 
(5) Stability and the treatment of divergence. As indicated earlier, stability plays 
the same role in the timed models as its dual, divergence does in the untimed ones. All 
behaviours we record in the timed models will come from observations we can make 
up to some finite time. This means that they are very different from the two types 
of observation recorded in the failures/divergences model for untimed CSP. There, 
the failure (s,X) meant that, after the trace S, the process would refuse X even if 
it were offered for ever after; s being a divergence means that we can watch the 
process performing internal actions, once again for ever. A process becomes stable 
when it loses the capacity to make any further progress without making some external 
communication. Importantly we can record the time at which stability occurs. 
What does a stable process look like? For consistency with the untimed models and 
in order to be able to make useful deductions about the behaviour of a stable process, 
we take a rather severe view. We assume that once it becomes stable a process’ 
available actions remain constant until one of them occurs, and furthermore that its 
subsequent behaviour does not depend on the time when the event occurred. In other 
words, given the initially stable process a--t P, the ways P can behave if we accept a 
at time 100 will be exactly the same as those which could have arisen if a happened 
at time 0, only with 100 added on the time when everything occurs. (The effect will 
be like ‘shifting’ the behaviours of P by 100 time units.) 
This view of a stable process is closely related to the principle stated earlier that 
no process has access to the global clock of the observer: if P did in the example 
above then it could ‘know’ it was being used at different absolute times and so behave 
accordingly. It also means that the activity of any internal clock which a process may 
start counts as internal actions. 
Notice that if we have observed of a process (a) that it has become stable and (b) 
is refusing some set of events, then we know it will refuse this set for ever. 
If, informally, we think of a process as having a red light on the side which stays 
on as long as the process is making any internal progress, then it becomes stable at 
the time when the light goes out. 
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The untimed theory takes a very uncharitable view of processes which could perform 
an infinite sequence of internal actions. All processes with this potential immediately 
were identified with the most nondeterministic one, and considered useless. There are 
two distinct places in which a timed theory can be less severe. Consider the process 
(pp.(( WAITx; a -+ p)o( WAITy; b -+ STOP)))\a. 
If x < y then (assuming a symmetric implementation of q ) we would expect this 
process to diverge in the timed theory and offer no communications to the environment. 
If, on the other hand, y <x then we would expect there to be intervals where the 
event b is enabled and the hidden a is not, meaning that, if we offer this version of 
the process a b, then - using timing information - we can guarantee that it will be 
accepted eventually. Since an untimed theory cannot make this type of distinction it has 
to identify any potential for an infinite sequence of internal actions with divergence. 
But as the above example, as well as various others, show, it is possible and desirable 
to distinguish the two when we have time to play with. 
The second place where untimed theories are severe on divergence is in the way they 
treat processes like I n (a + P) which can diverge but can also perform some action 
_ either instead of or interrupting the divergence. For various technical reasons which 
we will not repeat here the untimed theories often do not allow us to reason about 
these actions or what might happen after them, because they identify any divergent 
process with the most nondeterministic one. As soon as a process has the potential to 
diverge, these theories treat them as irrecoverably undefined. It will turn out that it is 
not necessary to make this type of identification in the timed theory. 
In summary, stability will give us the ability to relate the timed theory with the 
untimed one because the untimed theory is really a theory of nondivergent processes, 
in the sense that it treats any process which can perform an infinite sequence of internal 
actions as useless. The refusals which the failures/divergences model records are those 
after stubility. The timed theory should also let us reason about processes which can 
perform these sequences of internal actions, because time gives us the ability to analyse 
their behaviour with sufficient precision. 
2.3. The metric spuce approach 
In the models for untimed CSP, it is usual to use complete partial orders with con- 
tinuous or monotone functions as the basis for defining the meanings of recursions. 
Various workers have defined complete metrics over these and similar models of con- 
currency, usually based on the number of steps over which a pair of processes behave 
indistinguishably. Of course when a recursion represents a contraction mapping with 
respect to such a metric, it has a unique fixed point which must be the same as the 
one predicted by a partial order theory. The problem which attaches to this approach 
is that not all recursions give rise to contraction maps. Consider the recursion 
P=a+(P\a) 
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which fails to be a contraction in the number-of-steps metric because the hiding operator 
can actually push points further apart by concealing a’s which guard their differences. 
Indeed, over untimed models this recursion has as a fixed point any process of the form 
a + Q, for Q a process which cannot communicate an a until it has the possibility of 
divergence. 
Over the timed models the cpo approach leads immediately to problems.2 The most 
obvious of these comes from the need for a least or bottom element. Experience would 
suggest that this should be the most nondeterministic process, but it turns out that there 
is no such element in the models we use since it would violate the assumption about 
only finitely many events occurring in a finite time. We will see later that a requirement 
for increasing sequences to have least upper bounds would also cause problems. 
Fortunately, the problems which appeared in the untimed models with the metric 
approach now disappear. The reason for this is that we now have a different and more 
natural criterion for judging the distance between two processes: the length of time for 
which they behave indistinguishably. 
Consider an implementable operator F acting on a process P. (It is convenient to re- 
strict attention to the case of a unary operator, but of course the situation is no different 
in the more general case.) Provided we assume that the observable behaviour of F(P) 
depends only on what F can observe of P (rather than seeing into the structure of P 
in some way that the environment cannot - an ability which would probably make the 
definition of a denotational semantics based on the observations impossible) and that it 
cannot somehow speed up P to observe it faster than we could, then the possible be- 
haviours of F(P) up to a given time must only depend on the behaviours of P up to the 
same time. This means that, under the metric based on the time-of-indistinguishability, 
every operator will be nonexpanding. Consider the case of the hiding operator which 
caused us problems above. Although some of the communications of P are hidden in 
P\a, the length of time which it takes P to complete them is not: every event which 
P\a performs is attributable to one that P could have performed at least as soon. We 
might christen this healthiness condition of operators as ‘absence of clairvoyance’. 
As a curiosity, suppose we could build an operator F(P) which speeded up its argu- 
ment by a factor of q> 1. Then, assuming that recursive unfolding and the completion 
of the communication a both take time 6 exactly, the process 
could perform infinitely many actions in time 26y/(g - 1). 
Given that all operators are nonexpanding, and that we have assumed earlier that 
every recursive unfolding takes some time bounded below by a positive constant 6, it 
turns out that all recursions represent contraction mappings and so have unique fixed 
points. For example, the behaviour of a system up to time n6 will be determined by an 
2 These problems are not always insuperable. In one recent case - the infinite timed failures model [ 171 
~ the metric space approach was no longer usable but it prove possible, with considerable effort, to get a 
(non-complete) partial-order based theory to work. 
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n-fold unwinding of the recursion. (Of course, it may take substantially less unwinding 
than this for a given recursion; what we have here is a global upper bound.) 
2.4. Exploring compositionality: In search of the right congruence 
We have previously mentioned that the model we are developing is rather complex 
and the semantics of processes in it can be somewhat intricate. Before we construct 
the model it is helpful to review the reasons for this complexity. Readers who are 
familiar with the theory of untimed CSP will know that it is possible to give natural 
and compositional semantics to it in reasonably simple models, for example the traces 
model and the failures/divergences model. 
At this point it is worth discussing just what ‘compositional’ means in this context. 
A compositional semantics is one where it is possible to determine the natural semantic 
value of any combination, using standard operators, of processes from the values of the 
individual processes. Here, ‘natural’ might either relate to some operational or other 
intuition about what the semantic values ‘ought’ to be, or more formally could be 
defined relative to some operational semantics and an abstraction map which tells us 
exactly what the semantic values ought to be. A simple example of a noncompositional 
semantics for untimed CSP which lies between the two compositional ones mentioned 
above would be to model each process by a set of traces and an indication of which 
traces it could deadlock on. The two processes 
(a + STOP) n (b + STOP) and (a + STOP)o(b 4 STOP) 
would have the same value in this semantic model, but if we were to combine each 
process in parallel (II) with itself, the first would be able to deadlock on the first 
step while the other would not. Thus, it is simply not possible to give an accurate 
denotational semantics to untimed CSP in this model. From this simple example (as 
well as our discussion later) the reader will see that finding compositional congruences 
is not always easy. 
Given the similarities between untimed CSP and Timed CSP, one would expect that 
they could be modelled by similar congruences. In fact, this turns out not to be the 
case, as we shall shortly see. The essential reason for this is the same as the theme 
underlying the discussion of the differences in the treatment of internal actions and 
divergence above. This is that in a real-time theory we have to reason about what a 
process will do from moment to moment in response to various stimuli, and thus have 
the ability to resolve a lot of the nondeterminism that cannot be avoided when we 
deliberately abstract away from time in the untimed models. When modelling real time 
we are always concerned about what a process can do at a particular moment, while 
the untimed models have to be concerned about possibilities over all future times. 
Before proceeding with this discussion it is helpful to introduce some of the notation 
we will be using to describe timed behaviour: the notation of timed traces. 
Notation. A timed event is an ordered pair (t,a), where a is a communication and 
t E [w+ is the time at which it occurs. The set [w+ x C of all timed events is denoted 
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TX. The set of all timed traces is 
(TC)*, = {s E TC*I if (&a) precedes (t’,a’) in s, then t <t’} 
If sQTC)?& we define #s to be the length (i.e., number of events) of s and C(s) 
to be the set of communications appearing in s (i.e., the second components of all 
its timed communications). begin(s) and end(s) are respectively the earliest and latest 
times of any of the timed events in s. (For completeness we define begin( ( )) = cc and 
end(())=O.) 
If X C Z, s I\X is the maximal subsequence w of s such that C(w) LX; s\X = 
s (C -X). If t E [0, co), s 1 t is the subsequence of s consisting of all those events r 
which occur no later than t, while s 11 t is the subsequence containing the events which 
occur before t. If t E [-begin(s), 00) and s = ((tO,ao), (tl,ai), . . . ,(t,,a,)), 
If s, w E (TZ):, we define s 2 w if, and only if, w is a permutation of s (i.e., events 
that happen at the same time can be re-ordered). We will regard timed traces which 
are thus congruent as equivalent, simply different ways of writing down the same 
observation. 3 
Ifs,wE(TZ)*,, Tmerge(s, w) is defined to be the set of all traces in (Tz)*, obtained 
by interleaving s and w. Note that this is a far more restricted set than in the untimed 
case, as the times of events must increase through the trace. In fact, Tmerge(s,w) only 
contains more than one element when s and w record a pair of events at exactly the 
same time, and even these two traces will be equivalent (E). 
Given a Timed CSP process P, Traces(P) will denote the set of all timed traces 
which are possible for P. 
Suppose PI and P2 are both CSP processes that both perform some number of 
internal actions before terminating successfully. Perhaps one is SKIP and the other is 
(a--f a + SKZP)\a. Now consider the process (Pl; a + STOP)o(P2; b + STOP). 
In the untimed theory we do not know how long PI and 4 take to run and do not 
wish to specify this time. Also we do not know whether the implementation of the q 
operator runs both its arguments at once, gives the left one priority, or does something 
else. Thus, in the the untimed theory, there is absolutely no way we can tell which of 
a and b becomes available first. Thus, in calculating the value of 
((P,;a + STOP)o(Pz; b+ STOP))\a 
the untimed theory cannot exclude the possibility that the b will occur (presumably ac- 
cepted by the environment at any moment up to the one where the hidden a becomes 
3 Notice that, given this assumption, the order of events in a timed trace carries no information that is 
not also contained in the times of the events. At first sight it might seem more natural to record process 
histories as sets of timed events; but the problem with this is that it is possible in CSP to have a parallel 
process which performs two copies of the same event at the same time. One could use multisets instead, 
the effect of which would be the same as our timed traces under the above congruence relation. The choice 
is very much a matter of taste. 
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available). However, if we now set PI = SKIP and 9 = WAIT 1 and put a timed 
semantics on LI in which its arguments are allowed to proceed together until a commu- 
nication takes place, it becomes certain that the a will be available - and hence occur 
because of our assumptions about hiding - before b is possible. Thus, in this case, the 
timed theory would tell us that b cannot occur. Real-time analysis lets us make precise 
assumptions about how long various aspects of CSP will take to execute and to draw 
the appropriate conclusions. (Notice the similarity between this example and the one 
used earlier in the discussion of divergence.) 
The above example is actually very telling. We knew that the event b was not 
possible because we knew that the process before hiding could only perform a b after 
being unable to refuse an a. This suggests that in order to know what traces are possible 
in P\a we need to know something about the pattern of refusals in P. To confirm this 
suspicion all we have to do is consider the same process only with nondeterministic 
choice replacing external choice. 
((a + STOP) n (WAIT 1; b 4 STOP))\a 
We can reasonably expect the process before hiding to have exactly the same timed 
traces of observable actions as the corresponding part of the original version. But this 
one is not obliged to offer an a before offering a b, and so it can perform a b even 
after hiding a. This example means that timed traces without refusal information cannot 
give us a compositional congruence. 
In the failures/divergences model we only have to give information about what 
a process can refuse at the end of a trace. This turns out not to be sufficient in the 
real-time case. The reasons for this begin to be apparent from the arguments in the last 
paragraph, where we knew b was not possible because of what was refusable before it 
happened. In fact this example is not quite good enough, since we can tell, by looking 
at what refusals are possible on the empty trace and the times when b is possible, that 
the b cannot occur after hiding. Consider, though, what would happen if we composed 
the •I version of the above process (before hiding) nondeterministically with STOP: 
((a 4 STOP) q ( WAIT 1; b + STOP)) Fl STOP 
On the empty trace this can refuse anything, and can perform exactly the same events, 
at exactly the same times as 
((a + STOP) fl (WAIT 1; b + STOP)) FI STOP 
and behave the same way after each such event. Thus in a congruence based on timed 
traces and refusals after last communication, we could not tell these two processes 
apart. Nevertheless, if we hid a in them, the first could not perform a b for exactly 
the same reason as above, while the second one clearly could. The congruence could 
not therefore be compositional. 
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As a further example, consider 
PI = ((a + STOP)0 (b + STOP)) n (a + c ----f STOP) 
9 = ((a + c + STOP)o(b --t STOP)) n (a + STOP) 
On the basis of their timed traces and refusals after traces, PI and P2 are indistin- 
guishable - and note that neither uses WAIT t or hiding in its definition. However, 
let 
Q=(WAZTlo(b+STOP));a+c-+STOP 
Operationally, we would expect 
(4 11 Q)\b # (Pz )I Q)\b 
In particular, we would expect (on the assumption that the event a takes, or might 
take, time 5 to complete) 
((La>(l + t,c>) E Traces((S II Q)\b) 
but 
((La>(l + Lc)) 4 TracN(P2 II Q)\b> 
The essential reason for the sorts of behaviour seen in these examples can be traced 
to our earlier discussion of the hiding operator. We said there that all hidden events 
take place ‘as soon as such an event becomes possible’. This means that any behaviour 
of P in which a hidden event has been possible for a nonzero time does not give rise 
to any behaviour in P\X. In particular, any nonhidden event which is only possible in 
such circumstances is always, in P\X, pre-empted by hidden events. 
We infer that we need to know what a process can refuse during its trace, not only 
after it or upon achieving stability. We will have to know what the process could refuse 
at each time during the trace, these refusals potentially changing due to internal state 
changes as well as visible actions. This is a crucial issue in achieving a successful 
semantics for real-time parallel languages. 
Algebraic properties give a useful test of a mathematical model and the definition 
of a semantics over it, which is related to the discussion above and yet, in a sense, 
more concrete. For our discussion above has been based on an intuitive feel for how 
processes ought to behave operationally. We cannot turn this intuition into rigorous 
mathematical arguments without defining an operational semantics formally. Though 
this has now been done [25], in a way fully congruent with the semantics of this 
paper, the necessary arguments are both very complex and are tied to one specific 
operational viewpoint. 
An intermediate standpoint is to use one’s intuition to write down a number of 
algebraic identities which are ‘clearly true’ in any reasonable implementation and then 
to use these as healthiness criteria for one’s model and semantics. Examples we might 
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use are the distributivity of any operator that only uses (at most) one copy of its 
arguments over nondeterministic choice, for example, 
The 
Po(QnR)=(PoQ)n(PoR) 
R<QnR)=U’;Q>n<P;R) 
(QnR)\X=Q\XnR\X 
argument for these is that P n Q is intended to represent a process which can 
behave like P or like Q, and that therefore the behaviours of (P n Q)\u (for example) 
are precisely those possible for P\a and those possible for Q\a. Another example 
would be the ‘commutativity’ of hiding: 
P\X\Y = P\Y\X 
which one would expect to hold under most realistic implementations of hiding. 
It would probably be impossible to come up with a ‘complete’ set of such laws for 
testing a semantics which was uncontroversial. Indeed to have a complete set of such 
laws, in the most obvious sense, would imply that we had fallen into the same trap of 
being overspecific that we mentioned above in connection with a specific operational 
semantics. Nevertheless, such laws as these provide a valuable and more tangible sup- 
plement to the intuition used earlier. The failure of such a law or the impossibility 
of producing a reasonable semantics in which they hold will tell us that something is 
wrong. 
2.5. The timed failures-stability model ( TMF~) 
We are now ready to build a mathematical model based on the intuition developed 
in the last few sections. It will model each process by its set of observable behaviours 
_ timed traces with refusals throughout, up to some finite time - and will match each 
with the associated stability time. We will put a metric on it based on the time for 
which it is impossible to tell two processes apart. 
The main thing which it remains for us to decide is the way in which stability values 
are tied in with the timed traces and timed refusals which we have already discovered 
we need. 
Consider the processes 
P= WAIT l;a+STOP 
Q=(b+STOP 
WAIT 1; a + ( WAIT 1; STOP)) 
If we once again assume that q runs its arguments in parallel until a visible action, 
we see that both can perform the timed trace (( 1, a)) but Q (i) cannot perform the 
a without having made b available first and (ii) becomes stable later. If we were 
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to associate stability values with timed traces alone then we could not tell that the 
late stability of P n Q on trace (( 1,a)) only happens when b is offered first, which 
would mean that we would be forced to predict the same late stability on (( 1, a)) for 
(P n Q)\b. But Q\b cannot perform the event a because it is pre-empted, and it would 
follow that 
(P n Q)\b #P\b n Q\b 
in contradiction to the principle stated earlier. We can deduce from this that we must 
associate stability values with trace/timed refusal pairs - namely the whole observation 
we are making of a process. 
We still have a number of choices: do we record for each trace/refusal pair the set 
of all possible observed stabilities for it? And need we record not only the stability ob- 
served at the end of a trace but also those that may have been observed at intermediate 
points along the way? 
It would be inappropriate only to record the behaviours of a process which happened 
to lead to stability in a finite time. Therefore, if we were recording all times at which 
a process could become stable, we would also have to include a special value, say co, 
representing the fact that the process happens not to become stable. This would lead 
to problems related to our metric space approach, since one could not tell at any finite 
time between the process that could become stable at any natural number time and the 
one which could also remain unstable. 
Although we are assuming our ability to see stability, it is not something which an 
implemented operator will usually need to observe of a process in order to determine 
the timed traces or refusals of its result. Provided this property holds of all operators 
_ and we will assume it does - we fortunately do not need to know the set of times 
when a process might become stable. Indeed, we will assume that the implementation 
itself has no way of observing stability: it is simply a tool that we use to reason about 
processes externally. Another consequence of this assumption is that the stability of 
any construct F(P) at a given time depends only on F and whether P happens to be 
stable at the time which F has observed it up to (which, given our earlier assumptions, 
is no later than the current time). So in particular the current presence or absence of 
stability does not depend upon whether it happens to have been observed earlier. 
The previous two paragraphs together suggest that it is desirable and sufficient to 
associate each trace/remsal pair with a single stability time: the least upper bound of 
all the times (including co) when it might become stable, given that the trace and 
refusal have been observed. This is what we will do.4 
Notation. The following are some more components from which our model will be 
built. Stability values are as described above. The time intervals we use are finite 
nonempty, closed at the left and open at the right. Not only do intervals of this form 
4 An equivalent approach is to associate each pair with the set of all times after the end of the trace when 
instability might be observed. This has been suggested by Blarney [I]. 
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the most natural ones for partitioning the interval [0, co) = IF!+, but this shape of interval 
also turns out too be the correct choice for modelling process behaviour: it reflects the 
idea that an event which is offered might be accepted immediately, and allows us to 
reason correctly about events which happen at the same time. 
Notice that although refusal sets may contain infinitely many different members of C, 
they can only change finitely often in a finite time. This is essentially an assumption 
that processes and the environment only undergo finitely many state changes in a finite 
time: 
z : TSTAB = [w+ u {cm} (stability values) 
I: TINT = {[1(~),r(Z))~O~I(I)<r(Z)<co} (time intervals) 
2” : RTOK = {I xX 1 Z E TINT AX E P(Z)} (refusal tokens) 
N: RSET = {u.ZlZC RTOKAZ finite} (refusal sets) 
We define various functions over RSET, to extract the set of communications used, 
times used, beginning and end, shifting and restriction: 
X(N) = {a E c 13. (t,a) E N} 
I(N) = {tE [O,co)) 3a.(t,a)EN} 
begin(N) = inf(Z(N)), V’N # 0 
end(N) = szqJ(l(N)), w # 0 
begin(N) = co, for N = 0 
end(N) = 0, for N=0 
Vt> -begin(N), N+t = {(t’+t,a)I(t’,a)EN} 
vtE[O,cxJ), Nrt = Nn([O,t)xC) 
VZ’ICiW+NTZ = Nn(zxC) 
VaEC, NJa = {tI(t,a)EN}. 
Each process will be modelled as a set of triples (s, c(, N), with s E (2X)*, , CY E TSTAB 
and N E RSET. The following functions are natural projections of such sets and 
operations to ensure (i) that there is one stability value for each trace/refusal pair 
and (ii) that all equivalent traces are treated the same: 
Traces(S) = {s I 3a, N. (s, a, N) E S} 
Stub(S) = {(s, a) ( 3N. (s, 2, N) E S} 
Fail(S) = {(s, N) 1 3~. (s, ~1, N) ES} 
Sup(S) = {(s,sr,N)j(s,N)EI;biZ(S)A\==sup 
CL,(S) = {(s, cz, N) I 3~. (w, a, N) E S As g w} 
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2.5.1. The evaluation domain TM, 
We formally define TM, to be those subsets S of (TC)*, x TSTAB x RSET sat- 
isfying: 
1. () E Traces(S). 
2. (s. w, H) E Fail(S) * (s, N 1 begin(w)) E Fail(S). 
3. (s,a,N)ESAs~ww(w,a,N)ES. 
4. tE[O,oo)+3n(t)ElV.V.sETraces(S).end(s)<t+#s<n(t). 
5. (s, CC, N), (s, p, N) E S =+ CI = p. 
6. (s, a, N) E S + end(s) <CL 
7. 
(s, ~1, N) E S A (s. ((t, a)), N) E Fail(S) A 
t>t’>ar\tbend(N) 
+ (t’, a) $! H. 
Although some of these axioms appear complex, each reflects one or more simple 
healthiness properties. We will now give an intuitive explanation of each. 
1. 
2. 
Every process has initially done nothing at all. 
If a process has been observed to communicate s. w while refusing N then, at 
the time when the first event of w occurred, the pair (s, N [\ begin(w)) had been 
observed. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Traces which are equivalent (i.e., are the same except for the permutation of events 
happening at the same times) are interchangeable. Essentially, this postulates that 
there can be no causal dependence between simultaneous events: notice that if 
a process has trace ((t,a), (t,b)) then this axiom and axiom 2 show it has trace 
((t, b)). 
The process cannot perform an infinite number of visible events in a finite time. 
There is only one stability value for each trace/refusal pair: the least time by which 
we can guarantee stability after the given observation. 
The time of stability is not before the end of the trace. 
8. (s,a,N)ES+if t>cr, t’>a, ae:C and ’ 
w E (TX)*, is such that w = ((t,a)). w’, then 
(S. w, LX’, N’) E S A N c N’ r t * 
3y 2 cd + (t’ - t) such that 
(S. (w + (t’ - t)), y, N, u Hz u (N3 + (t’ - t))) ES, 
where Nt=N’lx, NZ=[a,t’)xC(N’n([cc,t)xZ)), 
and N3 = N’ T [t, co). 
9. (s, a, N) E S A N’ E RSET such that N’ C: N + 3~’ b CI such that (s, ~9, N’) E S. 
lo. (s,a,N)ESAt] <ffAt2>0+ 
3N’,P.N~N’A(s,P,N’)ESAB~tl A 
(t’6t2 A (t’,a) 6 N) + (s p t’.((t’,a)),H’ 1 t’) E Fail(S) A 
((O<t’<t2Ad&>O.((t’-c,t’) x {a})cN’)+ 
(S IF t’. (t’,a)), N’ r t’) E Fail(S)). 
11. (s, a, N) E S A I E TINT such that I c [CL, co) + (s, M, N U (I x C(N n ([a, co) x C)))) 
E s. 
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7. A stable process cannot communicate an event which it has been seen to refuse 
since stability. 
8. After stability the same set of events is available at all times. Furthermore, the 
behaviour of a process after such an event does not depend on the exact time at 
which it was executed. Thus, the trace w and the corresponding part of the refusal 
may be translated so as to make the first event of w now occur at time t’. 
The stability value y corresponding to the translated behaviour may, in general, 
be greater than the obvious value because the translated behaviour may in some 
circumstances be possible for other reasons. Note, however, that if stability is still 
inferable in the new behaviour before time t’, then the axiom may be used in 
reverse to translate the tail of the behaviour so that the beginning of w occurs 
back at t. This, in combination with axiom 9, can often be used to prove that the 
7 appearing on the right hand side of axiom 8 does equal cx + t’ - t. 
There is a phenomenon related to this last discussion which it is worth pointing 
out. One can think of the way we record stability values as giving a record of by 
when, given the timed trace and refusal observed so far, can we guarantee that 
the process attains stability. Subconsciously one might think that things observed 
after stability give no information in this regard, but this would be wrong. It is in 
fact possible, by making some observation, to realise that the process must already 
have been stable for some time. A good example of this is provided by the process 
( WAIT 1; (a + STOP) n STOP 
Depending on which nondeterministic choice is made, this process either will or 
will not stabilise immediately. But we can only tell from refusals that it was stable 
at time 0 when a is refused at time 1 or later. 
9. If a process has been observed to communicate s while refusing N then it can 
communicate the same trace while refusing any subset of N. This simply reflects 
the fact that the environment might offer it less and so have less refused. However, 
because less has been observed, the stability value can, in general, be greater. 
10. Given a triple (s, LX, N) and times tl <a and t2 20, there exists a single refusal N’ 
in RSET containing N and stability value /I > tl such that (s, j3, N’) E Fail(P) and 
it is consistent to believe that the (finitely many) changes in the refusals of N’ 
give complete information about what the process could have refused - because it 
can accept anything not in the refusal set. The events in s and the changes in N 
can be thought of as the process’ state changes. Notice that axiom 9 ensures that 
/j<M. 
The construction involving tl and /? ensures that the stability value a of (s, CI, N) is 
the supremum of stability values corresponding to such ‘complete’ behaviours - or 
in other words the time of stability is not increased simply though the environment 
failing to observe what would have been refused anyway. 
The last clause of the axiom states that, if an event was not refusable up to 
a given time t’, then it was still possible at time t’. This means that we are 
assuming that any event which was on offer up to a change of state is also available 
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at the instant of the state-change. Note that in the previous clause we state that 
(sI\t’,N’[\t’)~Fail(S) h w ereas in this last one we vary this to (s Ip t’, N’ 1 t’) E 
Fail(S). Of course these two say the same in the case where s has no event 
happening at time t. But if there are one or more, the refusals at time t’ refer to 
what the process can do after the event(s) at the given time, while the refusals 
just before t’ allow us to reason about what it might have done instead of them. 
This last assumption could be dropped if we wanted to consider operators which 
could cause a ‘clean’ withdrawal of an offer to communicate. It is included in our 
presentation because none of the CSP operators can cause such a withdrawal and 
because we consider it to be a property which is operationally reasonable. We will 
also discuss in Section 2.6 below another small modification to this axiom. 
The concept of a complete behaviour, introduced here, will be very important 
later. 
11. Something that is refused at one time on or after stability is refused at all such 
times. This axiom says the same about the end of traces that part of axiom 8 says 
about other points in them. Notice that these extra refusals tell us nothing more 
about stability time. 
Note 1. In both axioms 7 and 8, we carefully distinguish (via t’ and t) between events 
at stability and events after stability. This is a necessary distinction. For example, the 
process P = (a + STOP q WAIT 1); b + STOP will, in the standard semantics, become 
stable on the pair (( ), [0, 1) x (C - {u})) at time 1; however, (( 1,~)) E Traces(P) but 
~~>L((t,a)) $ T races(P). Events which are possible at the very moment of stability 
might, as in this example, result from alternatives to the stable behaviour rather than 
from the behaviour itself. This possibility of nondeterminism at the point of stability 
will cause us various difficulties later. 
Note 2. The axioms above are (when taken together) strictly stronger than those we 
have presented in earlier papers, in the sense that they restrict further the class of 
processes. The difference between this set and the axioms of [21] is that axiom 10 
above has replaced both axioms 4 (which it obviously strengthens) and 11 of the 
earlier paper. A discussion of this point and of our reasons for strengthening of the 
axioms will be found in Section 2.6 below. The numbering of the axioms has also 
changed from earlier papers. 
2.5.2. The complete metric on TMFS 
As described earlier, the metric on our model will be based on the length of time 
for which it is impossible to tell a pair of processes apart. To define it we need 
a function which gives a standard representation of a process’ behaviour up to time t. 
If S C (TC): x TSTAB x RSET and t E [0, OQ), we define 
S(t)={(~,~(,N)ESlcr<tAend(N)<t} 
U {(s, co, N) 1 end(s) <t A end(N) < t A 3~ 2 t. (s, ~1, N) E S}. 
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S(t) has a representative of each timed failure (s, N) which ends before t. Where the 
stability value is also less than t, it is included, and otherwise it is replaced by the 
standard value m. It is worth noting that any pair S1 and S2 of distinct sets of triples 
satisfying axiom 5 have a time t such that 81(t) z&(t): if E’uiZ(S1) and Fuil(S2) were 
unequal then we need only pick t after the end of some element of the symmetric 
difference. If (s, CI, N) E S1 and (s, 8, N) E S2 where a # fi, then t can be any time greater 
than both end(N) and the lesser of a and /? (which must be finite). 
The complete metric on TM, is now defined: 
d(&,&)= inf{2-’ IS1(t)=S2(t)) 
Given the observation we made above about being able to distinguish S1 and S2, it is 
easy to show that this function defines an ultrametric, namely a metric satisfying the 
strong triangle inequality 
The completeness of this metric can be demonstrated as follows. First, the set of all 
S & (TC)*, x TSTAB x RSET satisfying axiom 5 alone is a complete metric space under 
this metric: if S, is a Cauchy sequence we know that, for each t, there is n = n(t) with 
m>n implying S,,(t) =Sm(t), it is easy to see that the limit of the sequence S, is the 
set of all triples (s, CI, N) with a<cc contained in any such Snct,(t) plus all those of 
the form (s,m,N) contained in all S&(t) for sufficiently large t. Second, the set of all 
S in this space satisfying axiom 9 is closed, since any failure of this axiom becomes 
apparent in a finite time (i.e., if S fails it, then there is a time t such that S’(t)=S(t) 
implies S’ fails it), which means that the set of all S not satisfying it is closed. Finally, 
within the set of all sets satisfying 5 and 9, the set of all S satisfying any one of the 
other axioms is closed. Since the intersection of closed sets is closed, the model TMF~ 
is thus a closed (and hence complete) subset of a complete metric space. 
2.6. More properties of the model 
The most subtle - and most powerful - of our axioms is axiom 10. This says that 
each observed behaviour of a process can be interpreted in terms of some ‘complete’ 
description of how it might behave. If we define a t2-complete behaviour5 to be one 
satisfying the conditions on the right hand side of the implication, then this axiom 
together with axiom 9 says that the stability value associated with any timed failure 
(s,N) is the supremum of all those associated with its t-complete extensions (i.e., 
t-complete behaviours with the same timed trace, and larger timed refusal). Recall 
5 Depending on the circumstances, we will refer both to timed failures (s, N) of P and triples (s, G(, N) E P 
as t-complete behaviours if they satisfy this condition. 
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axiom I1 of [21]: 
(s.w, a, N) E S A N’ E RSET is such that end(s) <begin(#) A 
end(N’)<begin(w) A(V(t,a) E N’,(s.((t,a)), N[\r) $FaiZ(S)) 
=3 (s.w,cf,NUN’)ES 
This says that, if the timed failure (s.w, N) is observable, and if N’ contains events 
between the end of s and the beginning of w which were impossible, then the process 
would also have refused N’ if the environment had offered it. Since this must be true in 
every run of the process which exhibits (s.w, N), no further information about stability 
is gained from observing the refusal of N’, so the observed stability time is the same. 
(Note axiom 9.) 
It is a consequence of our new axioms. Assuming the conditions on the left-hand side 
then, if t > end(s.w, N U N’), obviously any t-complete extension (s.w, N*) of (KW, N) 
must have H* > NUN’, which means (by axiom 9) that (s.w, N U H’) E Fail(S). It is 
then easy to see that any complete extension of (s.w,N) is one of (s.w,N U R’), and 
vice versa. The sup property of stability values discussed above then ensures that the 
stability values associated with (s.w, N) and (s.w, N) are the same. 
For reasons discussed earlier we have not based our fixed point theory on a partial 
order. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for wanting to have an order over TM, 
based (as with many of the orders over untimed CSP) on the notion of nondeterminism: 
PC Q should mean that Q is more predictable than P - any observation of Q could 
be taken for one of P. Such an order will turn out to be useful for understanding 
the structure of our model, understanding the way it treats nondeterminism, and for 
developing a notion of refinement. Recalling that the triple (s,~, N) means that the 
timed failure (s, N) can be observed and that a is the supremum of the resulting stability 
values (i.e., any stability value less-than-or equal to a might occur), the order is best 
defined as follows. P L Q if and only if 
V(s, a, N) E Q. 3~’ 3 cy.(s, a’, N) E P 
or, in other words, if every member of Fail(Q) is in F&(P) but with a possibly 
greater associated stability value. 
We have already observed that the partial order cannot have a least element because 
of axiom 4 - the least one could have no bound on the number of events which can 
occur up to time t. It also fails to be closed under the limits of increasing sequences. 
In the case of C infinite this is easy to demonstrate, using the same examples which 
work for untimed CSP with unbounded nondeterminism, for example 
P,, =n{m + STOP 1 m > n} 
is a sequence of processes, ordered under C, with no upper bound - any upper bound 
could neither communicate nor refuse the whole of C in contradiction to the axioms. 
It also fails to be closed under limits when C is finite, though here the examples 
are a little more subtle and rely upon time-specific arguments. It turns out that no 
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upper bound of certain sequences of well-formed processes can satisfy axiom 10, either 
because they must have an infinite number of state-changes or because they fail to 
leave events available at the instant when they are withdrawn. As an example of the 
first, suppose Qn is the process that makes the event a available during the intervals 
[0,1-2-l], [l-2-2,1 -2-3])...) [ 1 - 2-2n, 1 - 22n+‘] and refuses it in the appropriate 
half-open intervals interleaving and following these. Let P,, = n{Q, 1 m 3 n}. A little 
thought will reveal that any upper bound of the ordered sequence P,, would be obliged 
to change state infinitely often in the time interval [0, l] (when no communication has 
taken place) and that there is no l-complete extension of the timed failure (( ), 0). 
One could plausibly argue for a strengthening of axiom 10 that would ban this 
counterexample. One of the things this axiom does is to assert that, at least as far as 
one can detect in some sense, processes only change state finitely often in a finite time. 
When we asserted in axiom 4 that processes could only communicate finitely often in 
a finite time it was done by postulating the existence, for each process, of a uniform 
bound function n(t) on the number of events the process could perform up to time t. 
We could have taken this approach with axiom 10 and also postulated that each of the 
t-complete behaviours for a process has its number of state changes bounded by n(t) 
(using the process’ bound function from axiom 4). The reader should be able to see 
that this would ban the processes P,, of the previous paragraph, since the number of 
state changes they make up to time 1 is not bounded (though, for any nondeterministic 
choice they might make, it is finite). 
The strengthening of axiom 10 would, however, neither solve the incompleteness 
problem with infinite alphabets, and nor would it remove the following example. Let 
tn be any strictly increasing sequence converging to 1 from below, and let Qn = ((a -+ 
STOP)o WAITt,);STOP. Under the standard semantics, the process Q,, offers a until 
time t,,, whereupon the WAIT& process terminates and removes the possibility of the 
a. If a is offered at exactly tn, it may occur or may not - the q operator has to arbitrate 
between two events which become ready simultaneously. This is precisely the situation 
covered by our discussion of part of axiom 10 - events which are offered are still 
possible at the instant from which they are refusable when withdrawn. Now consider 
the processes P, = n{Qm 1 m 2 n}. P,, may withdraw the offer of an a at any sufficiently 
large tm, but note that it cannot communicate a at time 1. It is however obliged to 
offer a up to t,, and as n increases this value increases to 1. Any upper bound would 
be obliged to offer a up to time 1 without the possibility of performing it at time 1, 
in violation of the same aspect of axiom 10. 
2.61. Injinite complete behaviours 
Axiom 10 gave us the notion of a t-complete behaviour. This gives us a ‘convincing 
explanation’ of how a process might have behaved up to time t, and the axiom tells us 
that we can find one of these extending any given timed failure (s, N) with a stability 
value as close as we please to that associated with (s, N). In technical manipulations 
we will be doing later it will be useful to be able to extend this to an infinite complete 
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behaviour, which gives us a convincing explanation of how the process might behave 
over all time. This will be a triple (s, c(, N*), where s is still a finite timed trace, 
a E !I!+ U {LX}, but now N is allowed to extend to infinity: it is a set of pairs (t,a) 
such that each of its restrictions N*l\t is in RSET (i.e., it only changes finitely often 
in a finite time). Informally this triple means that the process might be observed to 
perform the trace s and be observed though all time to refuse N*, and that given 
this we know that it became stable at time a at the latest. Such a triple (or, where 
appropriate, the pair (s, N*)) can be said to be a complete infinite behaviour of a 
process P if (s,N[\t) E Fail(P) for all t, TV= inf{cx’ 1 (s,d, N*l\t) E P} and the same 
conditions applied as for a t-complete behaviour, namely 
for each t E [0, co) and a E 1, and 
when t E (0,~) and a E C. 
This gives an obvious extension to all time of what axiom 10 provides us with 
up to any finite time - a plausible explanation of the state changes the process went 
through in getting to the trace s and those which might happen after the end of s on 
the assumption that no event subsequently occurs. The following lemma shows that 
these always exist, and that it is (as we might have hoped) consistent to believe that 
a stable process does not change state. 
Lemma 1. If P E TMps, (s, LY, N) E P, and t <a then there is an injinite complete 
behuviour (s, p, N*) of P such that N C N* and t </I< a. Furthermore, if /I < 00, we 
can assume 
Proof. We will first give one construction that works for the main statement above in 
all cases, and then give a different one which works for the second statement in its 
restricted case. Pick a value t’ such that t < t' <a. Starting with (flc, He) = (a, N), we 
use axiom 10 iteratively, on the nth iteration starting from (s, /In_ 1, N,_ 1) with t2 = t’ 
and tl = T + n where T = end(s, N), thereby obtaining (s, b,,, N,). Necessarily, the /3,, 
form a (not necessarily strictly) decreasing sequence of values between t’ and ~1, and 
N"c%+l for all n. And (s, bn, N,) is a (T + n)-complete behaviour for n >O. Now, 
set 
N*=N1T[O,T+l)U[N,f[T+n-l,T+n) 
n=2 
Notice that, by construction, each N*h’ for t’ E [O,oo) belongs to RSET. Since 
NCN*r2-+nCN,, it f 11 o ows (using axiom 9) that there is some yn with /I,, <yn <<cr 
such that (s, yn, N” I‘T + n) E P. Clearly, the y,, form a decreasing sequence with a limit 
/I* satisfying t < t' < /?* <cc Claim (s, b*, N*) is a complete infinite behaviour of P. 
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If (t, a) 9 N*, then choose n = 1 if t -c T + 1 or otherwise let n be such that T + n - 
1 <t<T+n. By definition of H*, we then know that (t,a)$!N, and hence (sbt.((t,a)), 
N,[\~)E Fail(P). Since N*r\t C H,l\t it follows by axiom 9 that (slt.((t,a)),N*r\t)~ 
Fail(P). If t >O and +a>O.(t - e,l) x {u} C N* we choose n = 1 if t< T + 1 and 
otherwise n is such that T + n - I < t < T,,. A similar argument to the above then shows 
that (slrl.((t,a)), N,r\t) and hence (sb.((t,u)), N*b) belong to Fail(P). This completes 
the proof of the first statement. 
Suppose (s, N’) is a t-complete behaviour of P and that (s, /I, N’l\t> E P for some /3 < t. 
Let A = Z(N’T[b, t)). If a $A we know by completeness of (s, N’) that (S.((t, a)), N’r\t) E 
Fail(P). Axiom 8 (with w= ((&a))) then tells us that, for all t’ E [fi,m), (s.((t’,u)), 
PI\p u [p, t’) x A) E t’~il(P). It follows easily that, for all t” <t’, the failure (s, N’I\fi u 
[/I, t’) x A) is t”-complete. Axiom 11 tells us, that for t’> t, the stability value as- 
sociated with this failure is fi. It follows that (s, ,!3, H’l\bU [p, cm) x A) is a complete 
infinite behaviour of P. 
Suppose that the stability value /I* produced by the first part of this result was finite. 
This must have been because one of the sequence y,, which converged down to it was 
finite. Clearly, there then exists n such that yn < T + n. Thus the preconditions of the 
previous paragraph are satisfied by the failure (s, N* f\ T + n + 1 ), t = T + n and /I = y,, . 
The conclusions of that paragraph then give exactly what is required for the second 
part of the lemma. 0 
One immediate corollary of this result is that, for any (s, ~1, N) E P, CY is the supremum 
of all the stability values c1* associated with the complete infinite extensions of (s, LX, N). 
2.7. A study of nondeterminism in TM,cs 
Nondetenninism is a well-known consequence of concurrency. In this section we will 
use the tightly defined model we have created to study just how, and in what forms, 
nondeterminism appears in real-time concurrent systems. We will find that the subtleties 
of real-time behaviour - in particular issues relating to instants when a process can 
arbitrate between some internal action and an external communication - make it a 
rather harder subject than for untimed CSP. 
One of the features of all the widely used models of untimed CSP is the way in 
which any process P can be identified with the set of all deterministic, or sometimes 
pre-deterministic processes Q which ‘implement’ it, namely P C Q. (Where the general 
nondeterministic choice operator fl was defined, this ‘identification’ simply amounted 
to saying that the set imp(P) of implementations was nonempty and fl imp(P) = P.) 
A deterministic process was there one which never had the choice of accepting or 
refusing any action, which was equivalent to being maximal in the partial order. In the 
models with divergence this notion had to be weakened to say that a pre-deterministic 
process was one which was deterministic until it diverged. Blarney [l] has written 
on this phenomenon and has argued that, since the correct structure of deterministic 
or pre-deterministic processes is generally easier to establish and justify than that of 
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general ones, we can say that the axioms of a CSP model are complete if we have 
such a property. The rationale behind this term is that, given we know what the set of 
‘deterministic’ ones is, and what the definition of general nondeterministic composition 
is, we can tell exactly which objects are the nondeterministic compositions of sets of 
‘deterministic’ ones. Thus Blarney calls a set of axioms sound if they allow all such 
objects, and complete if they allow no others. 
Certainly this form of completeness gives powerful evidence that the way the axioms 
extend the notion of (pre)-deterministic processes to nondeterministic ones is correct. 
It also gives us a much greater level of understanding of how the model fits together 
and how it treats nondeterminism. 
2.7.1. A taxonomy of nondeterminism 
We will find in this section that it is not altogether straightforward to construct an 
appropriate notion corresponding to deterministic processes and which is sufficient to 
give us a completeness result. The resulting investigations will, however, give us a 
much deeper understanding of the model and of the varieties of nondeterminism it 
encompasses. 
Fully predictable deterministic processes are sufficient for completeness in models of 
untimed CSP. Essentially, this is because it turns out that, given any behaviour of such 
a process (even though that process might be genuinely nondeterministic) it is always 
possible to find a complete deterministic process which ‘sits inside’ the given one and 
which exhibits the given behaviour. Things turn out not to be quite as simple in the 
case of real-time CSP. The following list enumerates various types of ‘unpredictability’ 
which cannot, for one reason or another, be factored out in this way. 
1. The first is connected with axiom 10, which specifies that a withdrawn event is 
still possible at the instant of withdrawal. This is a form of nondeterminism which 
we are specifying must be present in any process which can retract an offer of 
communication - and we could not hope to get a completeness result of the type 
above unless the class of ‘deterministic’ processes contained retracting ones. 
2. The second concerns processes which have an event possible at an isolated time, 
for example, 
(a --+ STOPob - STOP)\b 
which, in the standard semantics, can do a at time 0 but at no other. Since all 
refusals are over intervals, there is no process which can offer such a point event 
without also being able to refuse it if offered. We might term such an isolated event 
a transient event. No fully predictable implementation of the above process would 
be able to communicate an a. 
3. Transient events can manifest themselves in another, yet more subtle, form at the 
very moment when a process is becoming stable. Up to the time when a process 
stabilises, our axioms allow it, for example, to make a single event available contin- 
uously but have its subsequent behaviour vary quite arbitrarily depending on when 
the event happens. Provided that each of these different behaviours is deterministic 
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then the whole process is. However, once it has stabilised, axiom 8 tells us that the 
process’ subsequent behaviour does not depend on when the event did. The problem 
with an event happening at the instant of stability is that it might be an alternatit~e 
to stability rather than a manifestation of the stable configuration. 
This situation is actually rather similar to the one which led us to postulate that 
events are still possible at the moment when they are withdrawn, in that at the 
moment when a process would otherwise become stable it may be possible for it 
to do something else. The following example illustrates this. Consider the process 
((a -+ STOP)oSKZP); (a --) a + STOP) 
In the standard semantics, the first a is possible ‘transiently’ at time 0; otherwise 
the SKZP terminates immediately and the second a is also available at time 0, with 
the process being stable at once. The result of all this is that if an a is accepted 
at time 0 we cannot be sure whether or not the second will occur, while if we 
wait beyond this time we can be sure it will. Any predictable (even modulo the 
questions above) implementation of this process is forced, by axiom 8, to make 
the second a available following one at time 0. It follows that it cannot refuse a 
after the time taken to complete the first. Therefore the behaviour subsequent to the 
‘transient’ a is never reflected by any such implementation. It should be clear that 
we could have varied the above example so that the different behaviour introduced 
by the transient was delayed an arbitrary number of communications beyond it, or 
could have been of a different sort such as a larger stability time. 
In summary, when an event happens at a time after stability the same subsequent 
behaviours are possible at whatever times the event happens at or after stability. But 
subsequent behaviours which are enabled when an event happens at stability need 
not manifest themselves when the same event happens after it. This type of transient 
is more subtle than the last because they are not apparent when they happen, only 
in the effects they leave behind. 
4. A final source of difficulties can be found in axiom 3. Recall that this states that 
events which happen at the same time can be re-ordered in a trace without changing 
behaviour. While one order in which a set of simultaneous events occurs may be 
totally consistent with what is refusable on the traces where they happen, this need 
not be the case with another ordering. This can either be because the occurrence of 
one event in the set coincides with the disabling of another, or (and this causes more 
problems) with the enabling of another. We will see examples of these phenomena 
later. 
There is a sense in which difficulties 1 and 4 are more pervasive than 2 and 3. If 
we had a notion of ‘implementation’ which did not allow the forms of nondeterminism 
which arise under these headings, there would be processes with no implementations at 
all. This is not the case with the transient events of 2 and 3, which arise as alternatives 
‘grafted on’ to otherwise well-behaved processes. One consequence of this is that forms 
1 and 4 must be allowed throughout an implementation, while, if we are seeking an 
110 G.M. Reed, A. W. Roscoel Theoretical Computer Science 211 (1999) 85-127 
implementation of a process P which manifests one of P’s behaviours (,s,N), it is 
reasonable to restrict its transient events to ones in s. 
2.7.2. Quasi-deterministic processes 
To approach the definition we need for a completeness result, we will start out with 
one that is too strong for all the reasons set out above. We define a fully deterministic 
process to be one for which we can always tell whether a given (instantaneous) offer of 
an event will be accepted. Namely, for all timed traces s, t 2 end(s) and a E 2, we never 
both have s.((t, a)) E Traces(P) and (t, a) E N for which (s, N) E Fail(P). This definition 
ignores stability values, though for some purposes one might wish to strengthen it 
accordingly. 
To deal with the first, and part of the fourth, problem mentioned above we must 
allow an event to occur if the process was unable to refuse it in some half-open interval 
ending at the given time. We can define a process to be quasi-deterministic if, and only 
if, under the same circumstances as above, we never both have s.((t, a)) E Traces(P) 
and that there exists E>O with 
(s, [max{O, t - E}, t + E) x {a}) E Fail(P) 
If P has just started (i.e., t = 0), then it cannot both accept and reject a at time t. 
Otherwise, it must not accept a if it is able to reject it in some interval up to and 
including the the current time t. 
If we had just wished to deal with problem 1 then we would have altered the above 
definition to 
(s, [ma.x{end(s), t - E}, t + E) x {a}) E Fail(P) 
The difference between these appears in a process which has just been offering an event 
a, but has started to refuse it at the same moment when it has accepted an event b 
(there being no reason why a and b must be different). Axiom 10 does not force the 
process to be able to accept a at the same time as b - after all they may have been 
offered as alternatives. However, there are circumstances where we would expect an a 
to be possible, and can deduce this from axiom 3. Consider, for example, the process 
(((a + STOP)0 wAITl);STOP) 111 (b---f STOP) 
which is forced, by axiom 10, to have the trace (( l,a),(l, b)) and hence, by axiom 
3, has the trace (( 1, b), (1, a)). The second and stronger definition above would have 
disallowed the a after the b, whereas the first allows it. A subtle variation on this 
example appears if a and b are replaced by the same event. 
This still does not deal with the second and third problems discussed above of 
transient events. In dealing with these there are two things to notice. First, a given 
recorded trace might have a number of transients in it. Thus, we need to allow for at 
least any finite number of transients being possible for a given process. Second, it is 
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quite possible for a transient of either sort to appear after the process has previously 
been stable (i.e., on a proper prefix of the current trace), as occurs in the process 
a -+ (a -+ STOP q b --) STOP)\a 
Since we know that the behaviour of a stable process does not depend on the time at 
which the next event happens (axiom 8), it follows that if a transient is possible at 
some later time if the next event happens at one time then it must also be possible 
at suitably shifted later times when the next event occurs at some other time. Of 
course, this means that sometimes, though in rather special circumstances, a process 
must have an uncountable infinity of transients if it has one. Given this discussion 
and the existence of the ‘at stability’ type of transient it is obviously important for 
us to understand the nature of stability in the class of quasi-deterministic processes. It 
will also allow us to find an appropriate strengthening of the definition to deal with 
stability. 
The following result shows that quasi-deterministic processes actually have much in 
common with the deterministic and pre-deterministic processes of untimed CSP. 
Lemma 2. Suppose P E TM,vs is quasi-deterministic. Then 
1. Zf (s, LX*, H*) is a complete infinite extension of (s,0), for s E Traces(P), then 
(s, N) E Fail(P) if and only if N & N* Cfor all N E RSET). 
2. The complete infinite extension (s, a*, H*) of any (s, c(, N) E P is unique. 
3. Zf (s,cx,N) and (s,c(‘, N’) are both in P then c1= CI’. 
4. P is the only quasi-deterministic process with its trace/stability set Stab(P). 
5. Zf Q J P then Q is quasi-deterministic. 
6. Over quasi-deterministic processes, the inequality in axiom 8 becomes an equality 
(i.e., the stability value of the shifted behaviour is also shifted by the same amount) 
provided that the time t’ is strictly greater than ~1. 
Proof. Suppose s is any trace of P, and that (s, IX, R*) is a complete infinite extension 
of the timed failure (s,0). Now suppose (sl\t, N) E Fail(P) is such that end(N)<t). 
Claim that N C N*. If not, there would be times t1-c t2 <t such that no event of s 
occurs in [tt, t2] and an event a such that [tl, t2) x {a} G N and [t,, t2) x {a} n N* = 0. 
For all tl <t’< t2 there thus exists E with (sbtl, [t’ - E, t’ + E) x {a}) E Fail(P) though 
the completeness of (s, GL, N*) ensures that sl\tl.((t’, a)) E Traces(P). This contradicts 
our assumption of quasi-determinacy, and so the claim is established, proving part 1. 
Part 2 follows easily from part 1, since if (s,~(l,Nl) and (s,Q,&) were different 
complete extensions of (s,N) (and hence of (s,0)) there would be a time t such that 
either N1 I\t g Nz or N2bt e N1. We know that the stability value associated with any 
failure of the form (s, N) is the supremum of those associated with its complete infinite 
extensions. It follows that stability value is the one belonging to the only complete 
infinite extension. Since this complete infinite extension is common to all failures 
(s, N’) with the given trace, we have proved part 3. 
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In order to prove part 4 it is enough, by part 3, to prove that if P and Q are 
quasi-deterministic and Truces(P) = Truces(Q) then Fail(P) = Fuil( Q). If not then, 
without loss of generality, we may assume that there is (s, N) E Fail(P) but not in 
Fail(Q). Since s E Truces(Q) we can extend (s, 0) to a (unique) complete infinite ex- 
tension (s, N*). Necessarily, as in the proof of part 1, there are times tl <t2 such 
that no event of s occurs in [tl,tz] and an event a such that [tl, t2) x {u} g N and 
[tl, t2) x {u} n N* = 0. For all tl < t’<t2 there thus exists E with (sl\tl, [t’ - ~,t’ + 
F) x {a}) E Fail(P) though the completeness of (.s,N*) ensures that s/‘tl.((t’,u)) E 
Truces(Q) = Truces(P). Thus part 4 is proved. 
The proof of part 5 is completely elementary. It is worth noting that quasi-determinis- 
tic processes are not maximal under the order. In general we can ‘improve’ a quasi- 
deterministic process P either by decreasing its stability values or by exploiting the 
fact that we took the definition above which was weaker on what could happen at the 
same time as another event. 
Axiom 8 says that, if (s, a, N) E P and if t > cx, t 3end(N) (so that by time t we can 
be sure the process has been stable since time ~1, then any behaviour of P starting 
from t can be shifted back to any time t’b t. If t’>o! and we could, in fact, have 
deduced that the process had been stable since CI at time t’, then the same axiom can 
be used to shift the behaviour back the other way; since the inequality then works both 
ways between the shifted stability values, the shift must be exact. Since, by part 3, 
stability values in quasi-deterministic processes depend only on the trace, this deduction 
can always be made for them. q 
Part 4 is obviously very like the result which says that, in untimed CSP, a de- 
terministic process is determined by its set of traces or a predeterministic process is 
determined by its sets of traces and divergences. One significant difference is that, 
in the timed case, by no means every plausible set of traces gives rise to a quasi- 
deterministic process. An example of this is provided by the traces of the process we 
used to illustrate the first type of transient above. 
It is interesting what part 6 does not say - it does not say that the inequality 
of axiom 8 becomes an equality for t’ = CL This is because the definition of quasi- 
deterministic processes allows a limited form of the ‘at stability’ type of transient 
discussed earlier. Consider, for example, the process 
(a+I)oSKIP);(a+STOP) 
which, under the standard semantics is immediately stable and offers a, after which 
it can do nothing. If the a occurs at time t >0 the subsequent stability time varies 
linearly with t. But an initial transient destroys this relationship for t = 0. 
2.7.3. Adding transients to quasi-deterministic processes 
We are now going to tackle the question of how one might add a transient event 
(and its subsequent consequences) to a quasi-deterministic process P. Lemma 2 and 
the above discussion give us a clear indication of how to deduce, once we have been 
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told to place a transient at one point (a particular time in the closed interval between 
the end of a trace s and the stability time associated with s), where else it must be 
possible because of earlier stability. (We can ignore refusal information because of 
what we know from the lemma.) 
Suppose s = ~.((&a)) .w, t >c( where CI is the stability time associated with u and 
t’>~ Then we will write s9i u.((t’,a)).(w + (t’ - t)) (=s’) and observe that any 
transient added after s must be added after s’, shifted through t’ - t. (The time of 
the shifted transient is guaranteed to be in range by axiom 8.) If t’>t, we will write 
s&i s’ and observe that if si &i s2 then (i) sz &i si and (ii) (by Lemma 2(6)) 
the stability times of all traces beyond the shifted event in si and s2 are also shifted 
by precisely the same amount t. Since, if sl -f‘lsz, the first shifted event of SI occurs 
strictly later than any predecessor, if s{ E $1 then there is si Z s2 such that s{ &I sk. 
We can form transitive closures of these relations to take account of the fact that 
several events in a trace might happen after stability, adding in the re-ordering con- 
gruence, as follows: 
b If sNs’ then s&s’ and s&s’. , 
b If s&is’ and s’&s”, then szs”. 
l If s&is’ and s’ &s”, then s !+t: s”. 
l & and & are the smallest relations consistent with the above. 
Both these relations are transitive (adding the times) and reflexive (with time 0). We 
also have that s As’ implies s’ &+ s and that, in this case, the order in which the 
various shifts are carried out to get from s to s’ is irrelevant. In relation to E, it is 
easy to see that if s as’ then the groups of simultaneous events in s remain together 
in s’ and keep their relative order except that some might be amalgamated (in a process 
which can become stable instantly after some communication), and that ifs &+ s’ then 
the integrity and order of these groups is preserved completely. 
Suppose P is a quasi-deterministic process, that s is one of its traces with associated 
stability value a, a E C and t E [end(s), m]. Let us consider what the version of P would 
look like which had the additional (and nondeterministic) possibility of communicating 
the initial events of a process Q at time t, and then continuing to behave like Q. For 
various reasons it appears to be sufficient to consider only cases where no events have 
happened already in s at time t, namely when s = ( ) or t > end(s). The various varieties 
of transient which might coincide with events at the end of s either cannot arise at all 
because of the axioms, become duplicated by stability so that they are not transients 
at all, or can be dealt with by including the events of s with which they coincide as 
transients as well (essentially by absorbing part of P into Q). So let Q be any element 
of ?MF~ which can communicate at time 0. We can construct the element of EM,, 
which behaves as indicated above: 
sup(P u {(s’.w + t’ + t, 9” + t’ + t, (N’h + t’) u (N” + t’ + t)) ( 
(s’,N’) E FaiZ!P) As~s’~(w,cc”,~“)tQr\begin(w)=O}) 
We can denote this combination by P%Q, 
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Instant enabling. In our definition of quasi-determinism we only claimed to have 
dealt with one aspect of the difficulties arising from axiom 3. The concept of one 
event instantly enabling another, so that a process becomes unable to refuse one event 
because it has performed another at the same time, is another source of problems 
relating to the interplay of that axiom with the others. At first sight it is difficult to see 
how one might realise such a situation, especially if we assume that all events take 
nonzero time to complete. It is interesting to note that axioms 2 and 3 together state 
that if two events are possible at one time then either may appear without the other 
_ meaning that any absolute causal dependence between two simultaneous events is 
impossible. But in fact it turns out that we can get close enough to this instant enabling 
to have problems with our definition of quasi-determinism. 
Consider the process 
P=((a+STOP )(I b+STUP)oSKIP);STOP 
Here, the occurrence of either a or b at time 0 instantly enables the other, in the sense 
that the process cannot then refuse the other event - even though the original process 
could refuse both events at time 0 (and all later times) on the empty trace. Though 
the a or b which appear here are transients (of the first type discussed earlier) this is 
not the case if we offer the choice between this way of offering a and another: 
Pa(a-+c+STOP)o_L 
Here, things become rather difficult to disentangle. It gets worse if we replace P by 
the process Q which works in essentially the same way except that it cannot perform 
an a after time 0: 
Q = ((((a -+ STOP) q SKIP); STOP) ( 11 b --+ STOP) q SKIP); STOP 
The process 
R=Qo(a+c-+STOP)oI 
cannot refuse a on its first step but may, when it performs (O,a), instantly lose the abil- 
ity to refuse b. 6 If, on the other hand, it performs (0, b) then it can and must instantly 
begin refusing a. Thus, the trace ((O,a),(O, b)) is very much allowed by our defini- 
tion of quasi-determinacy, while the equivalent trace ((0, b), (0, a)) is not. We probably 
would not want to consider R quasi-deterministic, since it has a definite choice of what 
to do at time 0. Consider, however, the process which behaves like R except that when 
(0,a) occurs it must pick the Q behaviour rather than the one with the following c. 
This is an element of TM, (though seemingly not one expressible in Timed CSP un- 
der its standard semantics) which would have no quasi-deterministic implementations 
under the current definition. The most troublesome trace any implementation must have 
6The purpose of the c in the definition of R is to ensure that we cannot ignore that it might lose the 
ability to ref%e b - since along with this it also loses the ability to perform c later. 
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is ((0, b)), since it is both remsable and carries with it no explanation of why it is 
there (i.e., the forceable event (0,~)). 
Rather than attempt to get around this technical difficulty, we choose to simply note 
it and necessarily restrict the set of processes which can expect to be determined by 
their implementations. Define a process to be free of instant enabling if, whenever 
t’ > t and (s((t, a)), N) is t’-complete, then there is E > 0 and N’ C N such that (s, N’) is 
(t +&)-complete. This simply means that any events which might become enabled (i.e., 
unrefusable in a complete behaviour) instantly after a could have become enabled at 
that moment event if a had not occurred. Thus there is no causal relationship between 
the occurrence of a and the enabling of other events. Clearly, the various examples in 
the discussion above fail to have this property. 
It is interesting to note that, while ‘instant enabling’ seemingly describes the be- 
haviour of the examples discussed above on an abstract level - the communication 
of a at time 0 instantly enables b - in fact the CSP defined examples worked by a 
preventing an internal action that would have stopped the b from being enabled. Al- 
though, on the surface, this might seem a very fine distinction it is in fact significant 
when we come to consider stability. For in the mechanism which we described second 
there is the implication that, when the enabling (I occurred, the process had not already 
become stable. There is no such implication with the simple idea of instant enabling 
_ as might for example appear in the prefixing operation a + P, were it definable for 
actions a that take no time and P which can communicate at time 0. 
In fact, our axioms prohibit instant enabling after stability as is shown by the fol- 
lowing argument. Suppose @.((&a)), N) is t’-complete, where t’>t, that (s, CI, Nr\t) E P 
for CI < t but that there is no N’ C N and E > 0 with (s, N’) (t + &)-complete. If (t, b) # N 
then (s.((t,u),(t,b)),Nl\t) E Fail(P) and hence, by axioms 2 and 3, (~.((t, b)),Nlt) E 
Fail(P). Axiom 7 then tells us that (t’, b) 6 N for any a <t’<t. In other words, 
{b I(t,b) E HI 2 WT[‘T~)) 
By the structure of RSET we then know that there is E> 0 such that 
NT[f, t + 8) 21&t + E) x (WT[a, t>)> 
But exactly the same arguments and constructions used in the proof of Lemma 1 show 
that, for any t’> t the triple (s,cc,Nl\tU([t,t’) x C(Nf[N,t))) is a t’-complete behaviour 
of P. This is exactly what we require to establish our claim. 
Towards a completeness theorem. So far in this section we have presented a taxon- 
omy of nondeterminism in our model, the class of quasi-deterministic processes which 
are perhaps those most analogous to the pre-deterministic ones of untimed CSP, an 
operator for introducing transient events into them, and discussed the phenomenon of 
instant enabling. In this final subsection we bring all of these things together by con- 
jecturing a completeness theorem of the type discussed earlier, and by providing some 
evidence for this conjecture. 
Define the class of almost deterministic processes to be the smallest one which 
contains the quasi-deterministic ones and which, whenever P is quasi-deterministic, Q is 
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almost deterministic with communications at time 0, (s, a) E Stub(P) and t c [end(s), cc], 
PSQ is almost deterministic. In other words an almost deterministic process is quasi- 
deterministic except for a finite number of occasions where transients are possible, 
which are arranged in a single unbranching sequence. We will take these as the class 
of processes which will form the basis of our completeness conjecture. 7 
We define an implementation of P E TM FS to be any almost deterministic Q such 
that P E Q. Let imp(P) be the set of all its implementations. 
We have already said that the general nondeterministic construct ns would be al- 
lowed, subject to restrictions, for nonempty sets S of processes. In order to discuss 
completeness we need its definition and details of the restrictions. The nondeterministic 
composition of a set of processes can behave like any one of them - therefore the set 
of its observable behaviours should be the union of those of the processes over which 
we are taking the choice. Since, in TM FS, we associate with each timed failure (s,N) 
only one stability value - the supremum of those times at which stability can actually 
occur - we form n S as follows for a nonempty subset S of TM,F~: 
rlS=~(US) 
where the Sup operator is as defined earlier. The restriction we need derives from 
axiom 4: if the elements of S have functions n(t) bounding the numbers of events up 
to given times which are not bounded by some fixed function, then n,S would violate 
the axiom. Hence, we assume that there is a fixed function n*(t) such that, for each 
P E S, the number of events up to t in P is bounded by n*(t). The fl operator can 
only be used in such cases. 
Notice that the functions n(t) which exist for P by axiom 4 also work for every 
Q E imp(P), so that providing imp(P) is nonempty, the nondeterministic composition 
n(imp(P)) is well-defined. We can thus state our conjecture: 
Conjecture. If P E TM,=s is free of instant enabling, then imp(P) is nonempty and 
Fl(imp(P)) = P. 
If S is a set of processes Q such that P L Q (for fixed P), then it is easy to show 
that P g n S. In order to prove the conjectured result it would thus be sufficient to 
find, for each (s, SI, N) E P and t < CI, an element Q of imp(P) which contains (s, p, N) 
for some /I>t. 
We expect the proof of this conjecture to consist of a construction of these Q’s. Such 
a construction will necessarily be detailed and require careful checking of the axioms. In 
its essence we expect it to revolve around manipulations of complete infinite behaviours 
of the types constructed in Lemma 1. Starting with a complete infinite extension of 
the target behaviour, we would pad this out to a complete description of what the 
implementation Q could do after every timed trace and, where this is necessary detail 
’ If desired, this class could probably be tightened somewhat. For example, one could attempt to restrict 
the class of transients introduced to the two specific classes identified earlier. 
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(after at-stability transients), timed refusal. The only events of Q which could be 
transients would be ones of the target behaviour. 
The following result will probably be important in this construction since it says 
that, if in the complete infinite behaviour (s.w, N*) the first events of w apparently 
occurred at or before stability (because (s, CI, N*~(beyin(w))) E P where begin(w) < a), 
then we can extend the initial segment of the behaviour to infinity in such a way that 
we can still believe this. The importance of this is that events which happen after 
stability need to be treated differently from ones which happen at or before it. 
Lemma 3. Suppose that (s, a, N) E P is t-complete where end(s) < t < c(. Then it has 
a complete injinite extension (s,p,N*) with t f/?<ol and N*bt = Npt. 
Proof. First suppose t < cc. Then, by Lemma 1, there is a complete infinite extension 
(s, c(‘, N’) of (s, N) such that t <a’. Let N* = NT[O, t) U N’T[t, m). The same arguments 
which were applied in the proof of Lemma 1 show that there is D such that (s, 8, N* ) 
is a complete infinite behaviour of P. Axiom 9 (applied to the finite restrictions of N’ 
and N*) shows that ~1’ <p <a, as required. 
More care is required when t = a. We know that there is a sequence of complete 
infinite extensions (s, a,,, N,) of (s, N) such that a, is an increasing sequence converging 
on LX from below. If any of them equal CI then the same construction used in the last 
paragraph applies, so we could assume that all CI, are strictly less than a. We can also 
assume, thanks to the second part of Lemma 1, that the N, are all constant after the 
point of stability. If we set NL = Nl\cl u N,T[a, cm), it is easy to see that there is some 
fin E [M,, E] such that (s, P,,, NL) is a complete infinite behaviour. Now let 
Clearly, N*f\a = N!‘a, N C N* and N* is constant after CI. (The fact that all the NL, and 
hence, N*, are constant after cc, is necessary to ensure that N* has the finite variability 
property - N* /‘t E RSET - we require of complete infinite behaviours.) If we can show 
that (s, N*) is a complete infinite behaviour then, since N C N* C N,, its associated 
stability value must be CI. 
Completeness up to time LX is a straightforward consequence of the a-completeness 
of (s, N). Beyond a it follows because, if t’2u and (t’,a) $ N”, there is some n with 
(t’,a) $ NA. We then know that (s.((t’,a)),Nir\t’) belongs to Fail(P) by completeness 
of (s, NA), and hence so does (s.((t’, a)), N* It’) by axiom 9. 
We have thus shown that (s, CI, N* ) is a complete infinite behaviour of P, which 
completes the proof. q 
3. The semantics of Timed CSP 
One might argue that Timed CSP should be supplied with a number of different se- 
mantics which differ in how the various operators deal with time. Thus, an implementor 
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would not be forced to give all constructs exactly the same timing characteristics. He 
could reason about processes in his implementation by giving a semantics for Timed 
CSP which accurately reflected how it worked. 
If there is a fallacy here it is that CSP and Timed CSP are not usually thought 
of as languages which are directly implemented in the usual sense. They are used to 
specify intended behaviour, or to reason about implementations at a level a little more 
abstract than code. We feel that it is better to have a standard semantics for Timed CSP 
in which the great majority of reasoning is done. This has the obvious advantage of 
not having to parameterise every result about the language with the semantics used to 
prove it, and that each term in Timed CSP will have the same meaning to everybody. 
We imagine that it will also be rather easier for someone working with an implementor 
to follow the principles set out below than to construct his own semantics for Timed 
CSP - an activity that would carry an extensive burden of proof to ensure it was a 
reasonable one. 
In constructing the standard semantics we should aim for a combination of elegance 
_ maintaining as many of the appealing algebraic properties of the untimed semantics 
as possible - with expressive power. For provided we can express a wide range of 
behaviours in our language, it should be possible to capture the essence of the majority 
of implementations by representing whatever constructs they contain as hybrids of 
several Timed CSP constructs. 
Without further ado we will now define the standard semantic function dr : TCSP -+ 
TMFS : 
S,[l] = {((),w~)INERSET} 
IT[STOP] = {( ( ), 0, N) 1 N E RSET} 
~T[[~ZTfll = {((),4N)INn([t,~)x {J))=0) 
u{(((P,J)),t’,NlUNZUN3)It’3tAz(Nl)~[O,t) 
A (Z(N2) G [CO A J4 w92)) A Z(N3) 5 [t’,a)) 
~Tlp-pn = {(o,o,N)Ia$w)) 
u {(((t,a)).(s + (f + 611, a + f + 4 Nl u N2 u (N3 + (f + a>>> I 
t~oA(z(N1)C[O,t)Aa~C(NI))Az(N2)~[t,t+6) 
A C&4 N3 ) E &ruq) 
br[a : A + P(a>J = {( ( ), 0, N) I A n C(N) = 0) 
u{(((t,a)).(s+(t+6)),a+t+6,N1 UNZU(N3 +(t+@)) I 
~~~~t~oAfz(N1)~[o,t)~~nc(Nl)=O) 
A I@2 > C [t, t + 6) A 6, a, N3) E &~[p(a)]} 
ww?] = SUP({((),mUx{aP,aQ},N)I((),aP,N)Ebrl[P] 
A (( )Y “Q> N, E IT/&?]) 
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U{b-,a5N)ls# ()A( s, a, N) E SrUf’l U SrUQ1 
A( ( ), Nbegin(s)) E Fuil(b~[P]) n F'uiZ(&ljQ])}) 
8r[rlS] = sup(lJS) (S f 0) 
~#'llQ] = SUP({(~,~~~{~P,~Q},NPUNQ)I 
(S, UP, b > E &T[[P]J A (S, aQ, NQ) E &UQn) > 
~TU~XIIYQ~ = ~({(s,~ux{af,aQ},~PU~QU~Z)I 
%, W’, HP) E &#]I, (SQ, "Q, NQ) E ~T[QI 
with Z(Np) C X and C(Np) 2 Y such that 
s f (~PXlIYqj) A JGZ) c: tz - w u Y>>)) 
where 11x11 rw = 
{SE(TC)2 ~s[\(XUY)=s A s~X=vAJY=w} 
QrUP I I I Qn = iz!T({(~~ ma{aP, UQ}, N) I 34 ah N) E h-pj 
A (0, aQ, H) E aZ@l such that s E Tmerge(u, IJ)}) 
Br[P; Q] = CL(sUp({(s, a, N) I,/ $! C(s) A VZ E TINT 
(3, a, N u (1 x {J> )) E bjq) 
U {(s.(w + t), a + t, NI U (N2 + t)) ( J$ C(s) 
A end(Nl)dt 
Lf@\Xn = SUP({s\X,p,N)( Ekx>,j?>Oend(s). 
(~,a4 u ([O,max{kbnd(N)}) x-U> E ~#‘]}) 
&jf-V)] = Us, 4 N) I (f(S), a, f(N)) E euq) 
humn = SUP(((f(s),a,N)I(s,a,f-'(N))EbTuPn)) 
cF#p.F(p)j = The unique fixed point of the contraction mapping 
C(Q)=C( WAIT&Q), where C is the mapping on TM,c~ 
represented by F. 
We now discuss the construction of the above semantics and the assumptions that 
are implicit in them. Where we discuss the difficulty or otherwise of implementing a 
particular operator, the reader should bear in mind that CSP is not primarily intended 
as an implementable language and that it deliberately (in the untimed version as well) 
contains a number of features which are useful in specification and reasoning but are 
impractical to implement. Part of the idea here is that one should be able to use the 
full language at the specification stage, but be forced to be more selective when we 
refine our specification to an eventual implementation. Thus, in practice, while we are 
likely to be concerned that some subset of the language (possibly an occam-like one) 
accurately reflects an implementation, we are unlikely to have this worry about the 
whole language. 
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l Note that -L and STOP have exactly the same traces and refusals, but that, while 
STOP becomes stable immediately, I never becomes stable. These definitions will 
almost certainly remain unaltered in all semantics for Timed CSP. 
l SKIP is immediately stable, and is willing to terminate at any time. In practice, a 
process will probably be ‘switched off’ as soon as it terminates, which corresponds 
in a sense to the assumption in the semantics that SKIP is stable as soon as it 
terminates. In another sense it makes this decision on stability relatively unimportant. 
l WAIT t behaves like SKIP except that it only becomes stable and able to terminate 
at time t. 
l The prefixing constructs a -+ P and a : A + P are both assumed to take no time to set 
up (they are immediately stable and willing to commit themselves to communicate) 
and furthermore assume that each event takes exactly the same deterministic time 
6 >O to complete. Notice that a typical history of one of these processes has three 
phases, reflected in the refusal component written Ni U N2 U i-33 + (t + S), the first 
when the initial event(s) are on offer, the second when such an event has occurred 
and is being completed, and the final one being a behaviour of P or a P(a) shifted 
by an appropriate delay. One will frequently want to change some of the assumptions 
made here, and we will discuss this issue later. 
l The external choice operator described here runs its two arguments together - at 
their natural speeds - until the environment accepts a choice from one of them, 
which commits the choice. Thus, the process can, on the empty trace, only refuse 
sets offered by both its arguments and becomes stable when both its arguments do. If 
the first timed event chosen was possible for both, then the choice may subsequently 
behave like either - this potential ambiguity explains the use of the Sup operator. 
We have assumed that the operator has taken no time to set up, has the resources to 
run its arguments in parallel, and does not delay in transmitting their communications 
to the environment. It seems unlikely that, except perhaps in the case of self-timed 
circuitry, one would normally expect to implement an unrestricted operator with these 
characteristics. Either one would severely restrict the class of processes to which q 
can be applied (note the remark about implementing only subsets above), or change 
one or more of these assumptions. 
We need to place a restriction on the applicability of the general prefixing operator 
a : A -+ P(a) when a is infinite. For it would not in general be true that if all the 
b,l[P(a)] belonged to Tn/r, then so does bT(a : A + P(a)]. Specifically we have to 
assume that the functions n(t) which exist for all the brl[P(a)] by axiom four are 
bounded above by some function m(t). This excludes examples such as 
where P, = (a -+ STOP) (11 .. . / ( 1 (a + STOP) (n copies). 
l The two nondeterministic choice operators n and n can behave like any of their 
arguments. The reason for the Sup operators is again the ambiguity this causes. 
Since these operators are unlikely to play much of a direct part in an implementation, 
there are really no operational assumptions here. 
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As in the case of general choice, we have to restrict the application of n to sets 
of processes where the number of events possible up to any given time is uniformly 
bounded, once again to protect axiom ??. 
l The two synchronised parallel operators 11 and 11 x r are closely related. The first 
expects its arguments to synchronise on all communications, which means that it 
can always refuse any communication that either refuses. The second constrains its 
arguments only to communicate in the sets X and Y respectively, and makes them 
synchronise on all communications in X n Y. The resulting process can thus always 
refuse anything outside X n Y, can refuse anything in X that its left-hand argument 
can, and can refuse anything in Y that its right-hand one can. Notice that 11 means 
the same as ~/IL. Once again we are assuming that the operation takes no time to 
set up, and we are assuming that there are enough resources to run each argument 
at its natural speed, i.e., this is an operator which runs its arguments genuinely in 
parallel rather than timeslicing them on a single processor. 
l The interleaving parallel operator II also runs its arguments at their natural speeds 
with no setup time. This time, however, there is no synchronisation between the 
processes. 
l The sequential composition of two processes behaves like the first them until it 
terminates (by communicating J) and then starts up the second. In this semantics 
we assume that this operation takes no time to set up and, more controversially, that 
the hand-over happens instantly. 
The first component of the definition takes account of the behaviours of P in 
P; Q which have not terminated, have not been prepared to terminate so far, and 
have the ability to refuse to terminate indefinitely. These are behaviours of P; Q. 
The reason why this part of the definition includes the condition that the process 
should continue to be able to terminate is to get the stability value right: if we had 
a behaviour of the form (s, a, N) with (s, N U [0, end(s, N)) x {J}) E Fail(P), then we 
would know that (s, N) E Fuil(P; Q) but, since it is possible that J might become 
available before stability, the stability value a might actually be an overestimate of 
that of the failure in P; Q. There are two points one should note about this, first that 
if the failure (s,N) is excluded from this clause because of this indefinite refusal 
requirement, then it will be included in the second component with (w, N2) = (( ), 0). 
Secondly, if a process is stable and refusing J, then it will go on refusing it. 
The second component deals with the case where P has terminated and Q has 
started. Note that P must have refused to terminate up to the moment when it 
did. The Sup operator is once again present to deal with ambiguity in the ways in 
which failures can be put together. We need the CL, operator to deal with a slightly 
uncomfortable side-effect of our assumption that the hand-over takes no time. For 
it is possible in our model that P might terminate at the same moment as it is 
performing some communication, a say, and that Q might itself communicate, say 
b the same moment when it is started up. The net effect is that P; Q might perform 
two communications, one from each argument, at the same time. In order to satisfy 
axiom ? we must include the trace with them reordered with b before a. 
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l The definition of the hiding operator is one of the shortest - in contrast to the usual 
situation with untimed CSP - and yet it is actually extremely subtle. The ideas 
behind the hiding definition are similar in some ways to those behind sequential 
composition, where the first J is a hidden event. Recall the postulate made earlier 
that hidden events happen as soon as they can. This means that any behaviour of P 
which could not have been extended though its length by the refusal of the whole 
of X cannot be a behaviour P within P\X, since P would actually have accepted 
such an event, on offer continuously from the environment, and so not have reached 
this point. We have the same problem as in sequential composition with processes 
which are unable to continue refusing X until they are stable. This is the reason for 
using end(s) 6 I< M with 
(s, CL, N U ([O, max{p, end(R)}) x X) E a#] 
Consider, for example, the process 
(Iob-iSTOP)\{b} 
which becomes stable at time 6, even though (I q b + STOP) never becomes stable 
on the empty trace. The (s\X, /$X) recorded in the definition are just timed failures 
of P\X together with a time /I which the process can reach without previously 
having become stable. (Note that, in the case where P becomes stable still refusing 
all of X, fi might be less than end(N).) 
We are again assuming that the hiding operator requires no time to set up and 
imposes no time overhead on the running of a process. 
l The inverse image of a process P under a function f can perform an event a 
whenever P could have performed f(a). The important points to note about this 
operator are that there may be several different events mapping to the same image 
f(a), but that each behaviour of f-‘(P) results from a unique one of P. 
l On the other hand, the direct image operator can perform f(a) whenever P could 
have performed a. This is, in some sense, a more obvious relationship between 
events but, in the case where f is not injective, can map many behaviours of P 
onto a single one of f(P). Note that f(P) can only refuse an event a when all of 
the events which map to a under f are refused. Again the ambiguity requires the 
use of the Sup operators. 
l All the operators above are nonexpanding in the metric space (for the reasons dis- 
cussed earlier). Thus, any function we can define by combining them is also nonex- 
panding. It follows that, when composed with the contraction mapping sending Q to 
WAITG; Q, it gives a contraction and hence has a unique fixed point. We should note 
that the recursive construct is itself nonexpanding, since if F(P, Q) is a contraction 
in its first argument and nonexpanding in its second then p.P.F(P, Q), considered 
as a function of Q, is also nonexpanding. (The proof of this may be found, for ex- 
ample, in [23].) The assumption implicit in the definition given here is that making 
a recursive call takes time 6 deterministically. This is another assumption that one 
might very will wish to alter, and which will be discussed later. 
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It is often useful to use several, or even infinite vectors of, processes defined by 
mutual recursion. We have not included this possibility explicitly in our syntax simply 
because it is hard to give a reasonably concise, but sufficiently general, description 
of their syntax. Nevertheless, it is easy to give semantics to mutual recursions (and 
actually rather more important to than in the untimed cases where, without details of 
timing, one can simulate arbitrary mutual recursions as single ones). Given a mutual 
recursive definition of the form c + F(E), where e is a vector of process variables 
and F represents the same type of vector of process terms involving them, the standard 
semantics would associate p with the unique fixed point of the contraction mapping 
on the product space whose L-component is the semantic mapping associated with the 
L-component of F, except that d-delay is put on each recursive call of any Pp as above. 
Of course, this would be subject to alteration of assumptions about timing just as in 
the single recursion case. 
Broadly speaking, the standard semantics assume that the completion of all events 
and the unwinding of any recursion take the same non-zero time 6, and that otherwise 
each of the operators (i) consumes no time itself and (ii) treats its operands, at each 
moment, like the corresponding untimed CSP operator treat its ‘in the large’. Each 
of the operators preserves the axioms of TM ,VS, and is monotone with respect to the 
nondeterminism order 5. In relation to the various discussions we had earlier when 
constructing TM,c,s, we should perhaps now note the way in which the hiding operator 
essentially uses the fact that refusals are recorded throughout a trace. The reader might 
wish now to go back and re-examine some of the earlier examples in the context of 
the semantics we have now defined. 
3.1. Algebraic properties 
The algebraic properties of untimed CSP are well-understood and have been used 
both to characterise the semantics of the language and as a tool in the practical use of 
the notation. Indeed, many other theories of untimed concurrency have been presented 
chiefly through an algebraic semantics. The central feature in the algebraic semantics of 
untimed CSP is a semantic-characterising normal form into which every finite program 
can be transformed. The normal form is constructed using only the two types of choice 
operator (o and n) together with prefixing and I, thus every process is equivalent to 
one with no parallelism in it. 
As we shall see shortly, Timed CSP, under its standard semantics, inherits many 
algebraic laws from untimed CSP. It is, however, not possible to devise a normal form 
which in any way resembles the untimed one, and in our experience to date algebraic 
laws have not been nearly so useful practically as before. Both of these have their 
roots in the fact that our timed equivalence distinguishes many more processes than 
the untimed ones, most particularly in the sense that it records the exact times at which 
events happen. This means that there are many less pairs of processes which can be 
proved equivalent. The most striking example of this comes when we consider a process 
such as (a + STOP) [I( (b -+ STOP), which can communicate a and b arbitrarily close 
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together in time, or even at the same time. The only way one can write a process which 
can communicate two events simultaneously (or even two events separated by less than 
6) is by using one of the parallel operators. This means that no normal form can be 
created from the non-parallel operators of the language. 
3.2. Compatibility with the Laws of [4] 
The 31 laws of [4] are a reasonable test for compatibility of our model with the 
existing untimed CSP theory. 
All but 4 of the 31 laws of [4] hold in the the timed failures-stability model. 
These are: 
P((STOP = STOP ifP#I 
ZZ I ifP=I 
(a+0 III (b+Q> = ( a-+@’ Ill (b+Q))b(b+((a+f') III Q>> 
(a+P)\ b = (a +P\b) ifafb 
= P\b ifa=b 
The failure of the first and third laws simply reflects the passage of time (for ex- 
ample, WAITn 11 STOP = WAITn; STOP). The failure of the second law reflects our 
use of the delay constant 6 to implement our view of realism: two process in parallel 
can run faster than a sequential process. 
Finally, as discovered by Steve Schneider, the timed failures-stability model also 
fails the law P n (QoR) = (P n Q)o(P n R). 
For example, 
(a + STOP) F’ ((b + STOP)o(c -+ STOP)) 
# 
((a + STOP) n (b + STOP))o((a + STOP) n (c---f STOP)) 
Clearly, ((( 1, b)), [0, 1) x {c}) is in the failures of the second process but not in the 
failures of the first. Observe that indeed the two processes are operationally different 
in this respect, since as noted, timed state is determined by past refusal behaviour as 
well as future. 
Laws of Timed CSP: 
PoP=P 
PoQ = QoP 
Po(QoR) = (PoQ)oR 
Po(Q I7R) = (PoQ) n (PoR) 
PoSTOP = P 
(a+(PnQ))=(a+P)n(a+Q) 
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(a+P)o(a+Q)=(a+P)n(a+Q) 
PrlP=P 
PnQ=QnP 
Pn(QnR)=(PnQ)nR 
f'llQ=QllP 
P II (Q II R)=(P II Q> )I R 
PII(QnR)=(PllQ>n<PIlR) 
(a-+P) 11 (b+Q) = STOP ifafb 
= (a+(P II Q>> if a=b 
P III Q = Q III FJ 
(P III Q> IO R = P III (Q III RI 
P III (QnR) = V' III Q>n<P III RI 
P; (Q;W = V';Q>;R 
STOPIll Q=Q 
SKIP; Q = Q 
STOP; Q = STOP 
P;(QnR)=(P;Q>n<Q;R> 
(PnQ);R=(P;R)n(Q;R) 
(a+P);Q=(a-,V';Q>> ifa#J 
(P\X)\Y=(P\Y)\X 
(P\X)\X=P\X 
(PnQ,\a=(P\a)n(Q\a) 
WAIT 0 = SKIP 
WAIT tl; WAIT t2 = WAIT (t, + t2) 
(WAIT tl II WAIT t2) = WAIT max{tl,t2} 
(WAIT tl 111 WAIT t2); P = WAIT min{tl, t2); P 
(WAITtoa--+P)\a = WAIT&P\a, t>O 
((WAIT toa--,SKIP);P)\a = WAIT 6;P\a, t>o 
((WAIT toa --f STOP); P) \ a = WAIT 6; STOP, t>o 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have simultaneously provided a study of the detailed structure of 
our model TMF~ and of the types of nondeterminism which it can model. We provided 
individual explanations of its various axioms and also showed how these axioms fit 
together by proving a series of lemmas and other useful results about the model. We 
defined just what it means to be a semantics for Timed CSP over TMF~. Finally, we 
conjectured a ‘completeness’ result which would allow us to argue that, at least in 
some sense, our axioms were definitive. 
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We hope that the rather detailed work in this paper will provide useful insight, and 
a source of potential hard cases, to those engaged in more practical work using Timed 
CSP. 
We conclude by giving a brief survey of the literature of Timed CSP which defines 
the current state of the subject. The Timed Stability Model for CSP was given in [20]. 
The overall hierarchy of models was described in [ 18, 191. Proof systems derived from 
the semantic models and operators were described in [25,7,5]. In [l l] it was shown 
how a temporal logic compatible with timed CSP can be developed. An operational 
semantics for Timed CSP was given in [25]. The extremely useful technique of time- 
wise refinement for lifting process developments and specifications from the untimed 
failures/divergence model to the timed models is described in [25]. The addition of 
probability and priority to Timed CSP was accomplished in [15, 161. The extension 
to models of injinite timed behaviours was done in [ 171. Significant case-studies in 
the application of Timed CSP can be found in the above references, as well as in 
[ 10, 13,24,27-291. 
There are by now dozens of other papers on Timed CSP. A useful overview of work 
at Oxford on Timed CSP is given in [6,8]. 
We have not attempted here a comparison with related work on temporal reasoning 
in the literature; such comparisons can be found in the references above, particularly 
in [ 18,5, 11, 151. However, we do note that early independent work on timed versions 
of CSP may be found in [12, 14,30,2]. 
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